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SUMMARY Information-theoretically secure communications are 
possible when channel noise is usable and when the channel has an 
intrinsic characteristic that a legitimate receiver (Bob) can use the noise 
more advantageously than an eavesdropper (Eve). This report deals 
with the case in which the channel does not have such an intrinsic 
characteristic. Here, we use a pre-shared common key as a tool that 
extrinsically makes Bob more advantageous than Eve. This method 
uses error-correcting code in addition to the common key and noise, 
and manages the three components in random-number transmission. 
Secret keys are generated from noise, and messages are encrypted with 
the secret keys in a one-time pad manner. As a result, information leaks 
meaningful to Eve are restricted to the parity-check symbols for the 
random numbers. It is possible to derive the candidates of the common 
key from the parity check symbols, and the security of this method is 
quantified in terms of the amount of computations needed for an 
exhaustive search of the candidates, where we evaluate the security by 
assuming that all parity check symbols leak to Eve without bit errors. 
Noise contributes to not only generating secret keys but also enhancing 
the security because the candidates of the common key increase with it. 
key words: Channel, noise, error-correcting code, common key, secret 
key, bit error 
1. Introduction 
Highly confidential information, e.g., government and 
military secrets, must be communicated with maximum 
security between a limited number of parties. This kind 
of information might affect national fortunes 50 or even 
100 years hence, and therefore, its security must be long 
term. This report proposes a method that meets this 
requirement. It discusses security under the following 
three conditions: (1) only technologies available at 
present can be used; (2) communication is world-wide; 
(3) only a limited number of parties communicate with 
each other. 
 The method of Wyner [1] using channel noise 
is one way of maximizing security, and it achieves 
information-theoretic security. When the bit-error rate 
(BER) of an eavesdropper (Eve) is higher than that of a 
legitimate receiver (Bob), this difference generates a 
secrecy capacity [1,2]. Wyner assumed that Bob receives 
signals at a lower bit-error rate than Eve, but this 
assumption was later loosened. That is, so long as some 
of Eve’s received errors are different from Bob’s, Bob’s 
receiving conditions don’t have to be better than Eve’s, 
and the amount of information corresponding to Eve’s 
unique errors can be transformed into secret keys 
through public discussions between the sender (Alice) 
and Bob1 [3,4]. The method using channel noise has 
since been widely studied, and the researches can 
classified into ones on channel-type models and ones on 
source-type models [4]. The former model is one in 
which Alice and Bob share randomness from the channel 
noise. It requires bit errors that only Eve suffers from in 
order to generate secret keys from the noise [5]. A 
broadcast channel is usually assumed to conform to this 
situation [2,4]. The latter model is one in which both 
Alice and Bob receive randomness from a source, and 
when the randomness is correlated between Alice and 
Bob, independently of Eve, secret keys are generated [6]. 
Approaches that take both models into consideration 
have also been studied [7–9]. 
 The noisy channel method can achieve 
information-theoretic security. Another method that does 
so is quantum cryptography [10–12]. Quantum 
cryptography similarly possesses the concept of channel-
type and source-type models. The BB84 protocol, 
wherein single photons are transmitted and received, 
corresponds to a channel-type model [10]. Quantum 
entanglement-related methods correspond to source-type 
models [13,14]. 
 While methods having information-theoretic 
security are achievable in principle, they are difficult to 
apply to long-haul optical fiber transmissions. Optical 
fibers cause transmission losses of 0.2 dB/km, and as a 
result, quantum cryptography using single photons is 
limited to about 100 km. The noisy channel method faces 
another difficulty. Eavesdropping is easy in fiber 
communications if there is a preinstalled photo-coupler 
that divides the light. In particular, if the photo-coupler is 
near the transmitter, Eve can receive signals without 
being affected by channel noise. In this case, it cannot be 
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assumed that Eve will have unique errors, and thus, the 
noisy channel model cannot be applied. 
 Both the noisy channel method and quantum 
cryptography have an important mechanism wherein Bob 
can become more advantageous than Eve; the noisy 
channel method uses a broadcast channel or correlated 
randomness for this, and quantum cryptography uses a 
quantum-mechanics-based characteristic that 
measurement changes the quantum state. How these 
characteristics can be used has been the subject of 
extensive discussion. However, long-haul fiber 
transmissions do not possess such characteristics; 
another mechanism is needed in this case. We will turn 
our attention to the fact that the number of the 
communication parties is limited. For this specific case, 
we can assume a system wherein Alice and Bob share a 
common key consisting of random numbers with a 
uniform distribution (true random numbers) with a fixed 
length beforehand. The common key could be securely 
passed by hand, for example. Generally, the common 
key-sharing method is unprescribed as long as the 
security is higher than that discussed in this report. The 
common key gives Bob an advantage over Eve. Here, the 
common key is not used as a seed key, but is instead used 
as a tool for transforming the entropy of noise into that 
of secret keys. For this reason, the information of the 
common key is not reflected in the information on the 
transmission channel, and thus, the common key can be 
repeatedly used. The phase noise of a laser diode’s (LD) 
output, for example, can be used as a noise source (See 
section 7.4). Phase noise is always present in LD output, 
and it is sufficiently random [15]. 
 There is a method called the αη (Y00) protocol 
that uses channel noise and a common key [16,17]. This 
method is basically a stream cipher with quantum 
fluctuations that uses a common key as a seed key, and it 
uses multiple bases. However, the method in this report 
is not a stream cipher, but secret-key generation. 
Messages are encrypted with the secret keys by one-time 
pad. A common key is used only inside the transmitter 
and receiver, and the information on the transmission 
channel does not reflect the common key-related 
information. The two methods hence belong to different 
concepts. 
 The method in this report is not resistant to 
brute force attacks because a common key is used. 
However, the secret keys are continuously generated 
from noise, and the messages are encrypted by using a 
one-time pad. Thus, information leaks are restricted in 
the random-number transmission stage for key 
agreement. To evaluate the security, Eve is assumed to 
exactly obtain parity check symbols of an algebraic 
error-correcting code that is used to transmit the random 
numbers. Even if the assumption is advantageous to Eve, 
she must decode the error-correcting code, which is a 
block code. To do this, she must list the candidates of 
information symbols by using parity check symbols and 
list the candidates of the common key. In other words, 
Eve has no other decrypting method that is more efficient 
than listing the candidates of information symbols. In 
addition, the number of candidates increases because of 
the existence of bit errors, and thus, security is 
strengthened even more. Computational security is 
generally achieved by relying on some sort of 
mathematical difficulty. For example, the security of 
Diffie-Hellman key agreement is founded on the 
existence of a difficult computation in number theory 
[18]. There is no assurance that the difficulty will never 
be overcome. An efficient algorithm for overcoming that 
difficulty might be found. However, our method does not 
assume any mathematical difficulties, and therefore, 
there is no threat that an efficient decrypting algorithm 
might be found. The method requires an exhaustive 
search for the candidates of the common key in 
decryption. The security of our method does not reach 
the level of information theoretic security, but it falls into 
some range of computational security. However, thanks 
to there being no salient threat, we do not need to be 
anxious about any unexpected decryptions. Our method 
will be useful for protecting highly confidential 
information like government and military secrets. 
Cryptography generally has a trade-off 
between security and convenience. Methods with 
information-theoretic security have high security but 
their message transmission rate Rm, defined by Rm = 
nm/nall, where nall is the total number of transmitted bits 
and nm is the message part, is low (Rm << 1), and long-
haul transmissions using them are generally difficult. In 
contrast, methods with computational security achieve 
Rm ∼ 1, but generally face the threat that an efficient 
decrypting method might be found. Supposing we 
interpret these two kinds of methods as being at opposite 
ends of a trade-off, our method is located in the middle, 
because it achieves computational security that removes 
the threat. However, in so doing, the message 
transmission rate is reduced to Rm << 1. 
2. Framework 
This report concerns key agreement consisting of 
random-number transmission and secret key generation 
using the transmitted random numbers. Messages are 
transmitted with a one-time-pad using the generated 
secret keys. This section describes the framework of the 
key agreement and defines the security of the method. 
The notation is such that when a character style like X, Y, 
Z designates sets, the corresponding random variables 
are described with capital letters, like X, Y, Z, and 
corresponding elements are described with small letters, 
like x, y, z. Bold letters like x, y, z designate row vectors 
of x, y, z. Letters like Xn designate successive n letters. 
 Let us assume that there is noise in the 
transmission channel used for the key agreement. 
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Therefore, there are generally bit errors in the signals 
received by Bob and Eve. Let skA be the secret keys to be 
shared between Alice and Bob. Generally in a key 
agreement protocol using a noisy channel, Alice encodes 
skA such that Eg: {0, 1}nr → {0, 1}n, skA ⟼ x and sends 
them to Bob; he receives and decodes them such that Dg: 
{0, 1}n →{0, 1}nr, y ⟼ skB [1-3]. Because of bit errors, 
generally x ≠ y. The mapping Eg has two purposes: one is 
to make the information leaking to Eve meaningless; the 
other is to achieve accurate communications. The former 
purpose requires nr < n, and thus Eg is probabilistically 
performed. However, even if Eg itself is simple, its 
inverse, i.e., Dg, is not easy. Therefore, the probabilistic 
encoding Eg is not preferable for real systems. 
Deterministic encoding is better. For this reason, let us 
invert the process on Alice’s side such that Eg’: {0, 1}n 
→{0, 1}nr, x ⟼ skA [19]. In this case, all processes of the 
method can be made deterministic and thereby practical. 
Now, we divide Eg’ (Eg) into two stages, i.e., the 
encoding E and the secret key generation S, as in 
Definition 1 below. Figure 1 shows the framework 
discussed in this report. 
 As mentioned above, noisy channel models 
generally have an intrinsic characteristic to make Eve 
disadvantageous. For example, the broadcast model 
assumes that Eve suffers from bit errors independent of 
Bob’s ones. However, we do not assume such an intrinsic 
characteristic. Instead, we assume a common key ke that 
Alice and Bob share beforehand to make Eve 
disadvantageous. The following Definition 1 defines the 
key agreement protocol discussed in this report. 
 
Definition 1 [Key agreement protocol]: Let us assume 
that there is noise in the transmission channel. Alice and 
Bob share beforehand a common key ke  {0, 1}NK 
consisting of a random NK-bit string with uniform 
distribution over {0, 1}NK. Alice encodes a random nl-bit 
string x  {0, 1}nl with a uniform distribution over {0, 
1}nl by using an (n, k) block code of code length n and 
information length k (n > k), where x1  {0, 1}k are 
information symbols and x2  {0, 1}n-k is redundant 
information of x1; and she sends x and x2 to Bob. Bob 
receives y and y2 and obtains y1 that are error-corrected 
using ke. Alice and Bob respectively generate secret keys 
skA and skB  {0, 1}nr from x1 and y1. 
Encoding E: {0, 1}nl×{ke} → {0, 1}k×{0, 1}n-k, 
           x×ke ⟼ x1×x2 
Decoding D: {0, 1}nl×{0, 1}n-k×{ke} → {0, 1}k, 
           y×y2×ke ⟼ y1 
Secret key generation S: {0, 1}k → {0, 1}nr, 
x1 ⟼ skA and y1 ⟼ skB  
 
 Encoding E uses the common key ke. 
Decoding D requires ke and decoding is difficult without 
ke. A concrete coding method is described in section 5.2. 
As long as Bob does not fail in decoding, x1 = y1 and skA 
= skB. 
 In evaluating security, we assume that 
authentication has been executed and that Eve does not 
tamper with the channel by inserting or modifying 
messages. Moreover, we assume that Eve is an outsider. 
 Let z, z1, and z2 be Eve’s information 
corresponding to x, x1, and x2 (y, y1, and y2) for Alice 
(Bob). Eve’s final aim is to eavesdrop on messages. 
Because the secret key skA is used with a one-time pad, 
Eve needs to derive skA from z and z2 to achieve her aim. 
For simplicity, we assume that all nr bits of skA is used in 
message transmissions. Let z* and z2* be another pair of 
z and z2, and let skA* be the secret key generated from z* 
and z2*. If Eve uses a chosen-plaintext attack against the 
message transmissions, she can obtain any number of 
skA*. Here, to simplify the description, all the secret keys 
that Eve obtains will be represented by skA*. In 
accordance with these premises, we assume that Eve’s 
attack and aim are as follows. 
 
Eve’s attack: (1) Eve can passively obtain all of the 
information. (2) Eve can obtain any number of skA*. (3) 
Eve cannot control the equipment inside the transmitter 
and receiver or the environmental noise. 
 
Attack aim: Eve’s aim is to guess at least one bit of the 
secret key skA. 
Eve
Alice
E: x×ke ⟼ x1×x2
S: x1 ⟼ skA
Bob
D: y×y2×ke⟼ y1
S: y1 ⟼ skB
x, x2 y, y2
z, z2
Noisy channel
Noiseless
skA*  
Fig. 1  Framework discussed in this report. 
Because Definition 1 uses a common key, the 
security of Definition 1 is computational. Thus, we give 
the following definition. 
 
Definition 2 [Computational security in key agreement]: 
Let us suppose a game in which Eve runs a probabilistic 
polynomial algorithm to try to guess one bit at any 
position of skA from z (z*), z2 (z2*), and skA* in one 
arbitrary trial. Let skE be the guessed one-bit secret key. 
Let the probability of skA = skE be ps, which is called the 
probability of successfully guessing secret key. A key 
agreement method is called computationally secure if 
there exists k0∈  such that ps <  KNP121   is 
satisfied at a common key length NK ≥ k0 for every 
polynomial equation P(NK). 
 
 The security of the framework of Definition 1 
is based on the fact that decoding D is difficult without ke. 
Therefore, let us define the difficulty of decoding along 
the lines of Definition 2. 
 
Definition 3 [Computational security in encoding]: Let 
us define an encoding Ea by x1 = Ea(x, ke) in accordance 
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with Definition 1. Let us suppose a game in which Eve 
runs a probabilistic polynomial algorithm to try to guess 
x1 (x1*) from z (z*), z2 (z2*), and skA* in one arbitrary 
trial. Let z1 (z1*) be the guess of x1 (x1*). Let the 
probability of x1 = z1 (x1* = z1*) be pd, which is called 
the probability of successfully guessing information 
symbols. Ea is called computationally secure if there 
exists k0∈  such that pd <  KNP
k 121   is satisfied 
at a common key length NK ≥ k0 for every polynomial 
equation P(NK). 
 
 The security of an encryption using a common 
key is computational; it has no resistance against a brute-
force attack on the common key. However, if there is no 
efficient decrypting method except for a brute-force 
attack, sufficient security is still obtainable by choosing a 
sufficiently long key. The issue in computational security 
is not the lack of resistance against a brute-force attack 
but the threat that an efficient decrypting method might 
be found. Therefore, if it is assured that there is no 
efficient decryption method in an encryption system, the 
system is sufficiently secure. Definition 2 corresponds to 
that assurance, but what is assumed in order to achieve 
the security of Definition 2 is important. If Definition 2 
is achieved without assuming any mathematical 
difficulties such as that in the Diffie-Hellman key 
agreement, there is no threat that an efficient decryption 
algorithm might be found. The protocol of Definition 1 
ensures the security of Definition 2 by using noise in 
addition to the common key ke. It does not assume any 
mathematical difficulties. If the amount of information of 
secret keys generated in the protocol of Definition 1 is 
limited to the entropy of noise, the generated secret keys 
are fresh., Computational security in the sense of 
Definition 2 can be achieved using this freshness, as will 
be shown in Theorem 1. 
3.  Concrete method based on Definition 1 
The code length n and information symbol length k are 
generally assumed to be sufficiently long in any key-
agreement protocol using noise. However, a practical 
system might limit the range of n and k. Hence, we 
introduce a parameter u and use uk symbols as a unit of 
the key generation to overcome the limit. The following 
Method 1 makes the framework of Definition 1 specific 
from the viewpoint of an actual system, including the 
introduction of the parameter u. (See Fig. 2).  
 
Method 1: The noise-assisted key-agreement protocol 
based on Definition 1 consists of algorithms (RX, Ea, Eb, 
S) in the transmitter and algorithms (Ft(Fc), Da, Db, S) in 
the receiver. 
Transmitter: 
(1)  x ← RX 
(2a)  Ea: {0, 1}nl×{ke} → {0, 1}k,  x×ke ⟼ x1 
(2b)  Eb: {0, 1}k →{0, 1}n-k,  x1 ⟼ x2 
(3)   S: {0, 1}uk → {0, 1}nr, x1u⟼ skA 
Receiver: 
(1’)  y ← Ft(Fc(x)) 
(2a’)  D1a: {0, 1}nl×{ke} → {0, 1}k,  y×ke ⟼ y1’ 
(2b’)  D1b: {0, 1}k×{0, 1} n-k →{0, 1}k,  y1’×y2 ⟼ y1 
(3’)   S: {0, 1}uk → {0, 1}nr, y1u ⟼ skB 
 Here, x1u and y1u are respectively x1 and y1 of u 
blocks. x1 is generated from x with permutations in Ea, 
and nl > k. Let u ≥ 1, uk  , and uk > nr. Here, nr   is 
chosen to satisfy nr/un ≤ Cs0, where Cs0 is introduced in 
the next section. This choice makes Ea computationally 
secure in the sense of Definition 3, as shown in Lemma 
11, and makes Method 1 computationally secure in the 
sense of Definition 2, as shown in Theorem 1. In process 
(1), x is output from a random-number generator RX in 
the transmitter and is transmitted to a receiver. In process 
(1’), y is received by a receiver, where y includes 
transmission-carrier noise and environmental noise in Fc 
and Ft, respectively. Here, the symbol “←” is used to 
show that x is a probabilistic output and y contains a 
probabilistic bit error. We assume a memory-less binary 
symmetric channel (BSC) with a BER of pE as a model 
of the noise source Fc in the transmitter. An example of 
system conforming to this model is optical-fiber 
communications. Light already has fluctuations (noise) 
that cause bit errors at the moment it is emitted from its 
source. Another example is noise added on purpose. 
Processes (2a) and (2b) are the encoding E in Definition 
1 and processes (2a’) and (2b’) are decoding D in 
Definition 1. x1 is generated from x by using the 
common key ke in Ea, and y1’ is similarly generated from 
y by using ke in Da. A concrete example is described in 
section 5.2. Eb and Db are respectively encoding and 
decoding to achieve errorless communications between 
Alice and Bob. Thus, x1 = y1 as long as Bob does not fail 
in decoding. Redundant information x2 is transmitted 
through an errorless public channel, and thus, x2 = y2. 
Summarizing what has been covered so far, one sees that 
x and x2 are transmitted from the transmitter and y and y2 
are received at the receiver. x1 and y1 are only used inside 
the transmitter and receiver and they are not transmitted. 
Processes (3) and (3’) describe the secret key generation 
S in Definition 1, which is achieved through privacy 
amplification [19,20] using universal hashing. S is 
performed in units of u blocks. If x1u = y1u, then skA = skB. 
Thus, skA can be shared by Alice and Bob and used in 
encrypted communications of messages. Figure 2 
summarizes the algorithms in the form of a block 
diagram. 
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Eve is assumed to be able to receive signals in 
the best condition; i.e., she receives z ← Fc(x) for x 
without environmental noise. Let pE (pE ≤ 1/2) be Eve’s 
bit-error rate, and let pB (pB ≤ 1/2) be Bob’s bit-error rate. 
Because Bob’s signals are affected by environmental 
noise Ft, generally pB ≥ pE, where equality corresponds 
to the case of a noiseless channel. 
Redundant information x2 is openly 
transmitted through an errorless public channel in 
Method 1. This is because this setup makes the security 
analysis easy. When x2 is transmitted through a channel 
with errors, the setup makes Eve disadvantageous. Thus, 
even if x2 is transmitted through the same channel as x is, 
the security assured for Method 1 is kept (see section 
6.2). 
RX: Random numbers
Db: Error correction
skA
Transmitter Receiver
Public channel
Random-number 
transmission channel
Fc
x
Eve
pE
pB
Ft
y1 = x1x2
y2z z2
Ea :Encoding
Eb :Error-correcting coding
x1
S: Privacy amplification
x1
S: Privacy amplification
Da :Decoding
skB
y1’
y
skA*
ke
ke
 
Fig. 2  Block diagram of Method 1. 
4. Conditional Secrecy Capacity 
The framework of Definition 1 (Method 1) aims to 
achieve the security of Definition 2 by limiting the 
entropy of the generated secret keys to that of noise. The 
idea is the same as that of secrecy capacity [1-4]. 
However, the secrecy capacity is defined for cases in 
which secret keys are generated from noise without a 
common key. It is not defined for the case of using a 
common key. For this reason, we define the conditional 
secrecy capacity Cs as a similar quantity. This quantity is 
defined under the assumption that the common key ke is 
secret, and the quantity expresses how many secret keys 
are generated from noise under the assumption, where 
“secret” means that Eve has no information about the 
common key. 
 The number of bit errors originating from 
noise statistically fluctuates. n and k should be 
sufficiently large to reduce the statistical fluctuations in 
each block. However, their range might be limited in 
actual systems. Therefore, we define Cs that is applicable 
even to n and k of limited size by introducing the 
parameter u. The following definition 4 assumes that 
Alice and Bob share a common key ke and it is kept 
secret from Eve. The prerequisite is expressed as “ |ke ← 
Ke” in the following. 
Definition 4 [Conditional secrecy rate and capacity]: In 
Method 1, the common key ke is assumed to be kept 
secret from Eve, and the encoding Ea is assumed to be 
computationally secure in the sense of Definition 3. 
Under the assumptions, if the following four conditions 
are satisfied for a given γ > 0, Rs is called the conditional 
secrecy rate for a given γ. The maximum of Rs is Cs and 
is called the conditional secrecy capacity for the given γ. 
(1) Pr{SkAnr ≠ SkBnr |ke ← Ke} < γ 
(2) Pr{I(SkAnr |ke ← Ke; SkEnr)/nr < γ} > (1 – γ){1 – 1/2k – 
1/P(NK)} 
(3) log2|SkAnr|/nr < H(SkAnr |ke ← Ke)/nr + γ 
(4) Pr{H(SkAnr |ke ← Ke)/un > Rs – γ} > 1 – γ 
Here, SkEnr are secret keys of nr bits generated from Z nl 
and Z2u(n-k) through Eve’s arbitrary guess. 
 
 Item (1) assures that Alice and Bob can 
communicate with each other with a sufficiently small 
error probability. Item (2) assures that the leaks of secret 
keys to Eve are sufficiently small. The factor (1 – γ) in 
Pr{…} > (1 – γ){1 – 1/2k – 1/P(NK)} considers the rare 
case where the number of bit errors in un symbols is 
extremely small, owing to statistical fluctuations. The 
factor {1 – 1/2k – 1/P(NK)} reflects the assumption that 
the encoding Ea is computationally secure in the sense of 
Definition 3. Item (3) assures the uniformity of SkAnr. 
Item (4) indicates the condition that Rs should satisfy in 
accordance with items (1) – (3). The description Pr{…} 
> 1 – γ considers the rare case where the number of bit 
errors is extremely small, similar to Item (2). 
 Reference [19] describes the theory of privacy 
amplification as methods of generating the secret key S. 
Let Alice’s and Bob’s information be a random nA-bit 
string with a uniform distribution over {0, 1}nA and let 
Eve’s corresponding information be nE-bits. Let any ns of 
0 < ns < nA – nE be a safety parameter, and let nr = nA – 
nE – ns. Theorem 3 and corollary 5 of Ref. [19] 
respectively give H(SkAnr) = 
 
2ln2
A
1
n
r XRn
rn

  and 
  2ln2; sr kEkA nnn rSSI   when Alice and Bob generate an 
nr-bit string from an nA-bit string by universal hashing 
[19]. Here, R(X1nA) is the Rényi entropy for the collisions 
in two independent trials, and it is given by R(X1nA) = –
log2Pc(X1nA) and Pc(X1nA) =     AA1 1,0
2
A1on Px x  by 
letting Po(x1A) be the occurrence probability of x1A  {0, 
1}nA; rkE
n
S  is the result of Eve’s arbitrary guess. Eve’s 
information is nE bits, but it is not restricted to nE-bit 
strings. 
 The claims of Theorem 3 and Corollary 5 in 
ref. [19] are applicable to Method 1 under the condition 
that the common key ke is secret. The parameters n and k 
in Method 1 are determined such that signals with a bit-
error rate of pB are error-correctable. Let tc be the number 
of bit errors definitely correctable per block, which is the 
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lower limit of the maximum number of errors that can be 
corrected. Let tm be the upper limit of the maximum 
number of errors that can be corrected per block, in 
which bit errors have the possibility of being corrected 
but the possibility is indefinite. The numbers tc and tm are 
characteristic parameters of the used code. 
 Definition 4 considers the statistical 
fluctuations of the bit errors. Now, let us define some 
quantities as preparation. Let the number of Eve’s bit 
errors per u blocks of information symbols be nue, and let 
its average be 
eun = ukpE and standard deviation be σu2. 
Let >0 = {r  | r > 0}. 
 
Lemma 1: In Method 1, the common key ke is assumed 
to be kept secret from Eve. Let the transmission channel 
be a memory-less binary symmetric channel (BSC). Let 
pσE =   e2eE uuu nrnp  by using an r  >0 that 
satisfies Pr{nue < eun – rσu2} < γ for a small given γ > 0. 
Let ns be the safe parameter in the secret key generation 
S. If encoding Ea is computationally secure in the sense 
of Definition 3, the four conditions in Definition 4 can be 
satisfied by appropriately selecting the parameters n, k, u, 
and ns for the small given γ > 0. The conditional secrecy 
capacity for the given γ is Cs ≥ (k – tm)/n·h(pσE) – ns/un 
when using the binary entropy function h(p) = – plog2p – 
(1 – p)log2(1 – p) (See Fig. 3). The whole secret key SkAnr 
is assumed to be used for message transmissions. 
 
Proof: (1) Let neb be the number of Bob’s bit errors per 
block of code. Let ε > 0 be a parameter that satisfies 1 – 
(1 – ε)u ≤ γ. The parameters n and k are determined such 
that Pr{neb > tc} < ε for the small given ε > 0. Bob can 
generate Y1k from Y nl by using the common key ke, and 
he can correct all the errors except for a small probability 
Pr{neb > tc} < ε. In this case, Pr{SkAnr ≠ SkBnr |ke ← Ke} = 
1 – [1 – Pr{ne > tc}]u < 1 – (1 – ε)u ≤ γ. Thus, Definition 
4(1) is satisfied. 
(2) According to the assumption, the probability with 
which Eve successfully generates X1k without ke in one 
arbitrary trial is bounded by  KNP
k 121  . Let us 
suppose that Eve does not succeed in generating X1k. 
Even in the case, she obtains Z nl and Z2n-k. Because all of 
SkAnr is used in the message transmissions in accordance 
with the assumption, the X1k-related information 
obtainable by Eve is restricted to Z nl and Z2n-k. First, let 
us consider the information that Eve obtains from only 
Znl. Because Eve does not have ke, H(X|Z) ≤ 
H((X1|ke←Ke)|Z) is satisfied. Here, let “X1|ke←Ke” 
denote “X1” for simplicity. Then, H(X |Z) ≤ H(X1|Z). If 
Eve’s information is only Z nl, even though Z1k is 
generated from Z nl, the amount of information she gets is 
unchanged, i.e., H(X1|Z) = H(X1|Z Z1). H(X1|Z Z1) ≤ 
H(X1|Z1) is generally satisfied. Thus, H(X |Z) ≤ H(X1|Z1). 
Because X is a binary random number with a uniform 
distribution, X1 generated from X nl with permutations 
also has such a property, i.e., H(X) = H(X1) = 1. Thus, 
I(X;Z) = H(X) – H(X|Z) ≥ H(X1) – H(X1|Z1) = I(X1;Z1). 
Next, let us consider the information that Eve obtains 
from Z2n-k as well as Z nl. When Z1k, a permutation of Z nl, 
and the Z2n-k function as a code, Z1k is error-corrected and 
Eve obtains X1k. This case is included in the case in 
which Eve succeeded in generating X1k. Because we are 
discussing the case in which Eve does not succeed in 
generating X1k, Z1k and Z2n-k do not function as a code. In 
this case, Eve cannot correct errors, but Z2n-k involves 
redundant information for correcting tm bits of the errors 
of Z1k at maximum, where tm is a characteristic parameter 
of the used code. If the function of Z2n-k is evaluated most 
advantageously from the Eve’s standpoint, the effect of 
Z2n-k is to repair H(X1) – H(X1|Z1) back to H(X1) for tm 
symbols of Z1k at maximum (see Fig. 3(c)). For the 
remaining (k – tm) symbols, the mutual information 
H(X1) – H(X1|Z1) is unchanged because of the correction 
limit of the used code. Hence, when Eve does not 
succeed in generating X1k, the amount of information per 
u blocks is  
nE ≤ utmH(X1) + u(k – tm)[H(X1) – H(X1|Z1)] 
≤ utmH(X1) + u(k – tm)[H(X) – H(X | Z)]. 
Because H(X) = H(X1) = 1, 
nE ≤ utm + u(k – tm)[1 – H(X|Z)]. 
H(X|Z) is H(X|Z) = h(pE) using the average bit-error rate. 
However, if the actual number of bit errors in one block 
is less than the average number of bit errors determined 
by pE, Eve actually obtains more information than the 
average amount of information. Therefore, we must take 
Eve`s situation into account by considering the statistical 
fluctuations of the bit errors. In particular, we will 
consider the statistical fluctuations for u blocks in the bit 
sequence because the unit of the secret key generation is 
u blocks. Because H(X|Z) is described using a bit-error 
rate, we describe the statistical fluctuations by using 
those of the bit-error rate that is evaluated for every u 
blocks of the bit sequence. Because pσE 
=   E2eE uuu nrnp   is defined using r that satisfies 
Pr{nue < eun – rσu2} < γ, H(X|Z) in each sequence of u 
blocks satisfies H(X|Z) ≥ h(pσE) except for a small 
probability Pr{nue < eun – rσu2} < γ. In this case, 
nE ≤ utm + u(k – tm)[1 – h(pσE)]. 
Because Alice’s information per u blocks is nA = uk, we 
have 
nA – nE ≥ u(k – tm)h(pσE). 
Let nr = nA – nE – ns for any positive safe parameter ns < 
nA – nE. According to Corollary 5 in ref. [19], 
  2ln2; sr kEeekA nnn rSSI  Kk  can be achieved by 
universal hashing. Because of nA – nE = O(u),2 ns and nr 
can be also chosen to be O(u). Thus, 
  rnn nSSI rkEeekA ;r Kk  ≤ 2ln2 rs nn < γ can be satisfied 
                                                        
2 In this report, notations O(u) and O(1/u) are used for u 
→ ∞. 
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for the given γ by appropriately choosing u. This relation 
is satisfied except for the small probability Pr{nue < eun – 
rσu2} < γ and for the case that Eve does not succeed in 
generating X1k. pd in Definition 3 is the probability of 
successfully guessing information symbols for one block. 
Let pdu be this probability for u blocks. Generally, 1 – pdu 
≥ 1 – pd, and from the assumption, 1 – pd > 1 – 1/2k – 
1/P(NK). Thus, 1 – pdu > 1 – 1/2k – 1/P(NK). According to 
the above-mentioned two conditions, Pr{I(SkAnr |ke←Ke; 
SkEnr)/nr < γ} > (1 – γ)(1 – pdu). Hence, Pr{I(SkAnr |ke←Ke; 
SkEnr)/nr < γ} > (1 – γ){1 – 1/2k – 1/P(NK)}, and 
Definition 4(2) is satisfied. 
(3) According to Theorem 3 in Ref. [19], H(SkAnr|ke←Ke) 
≥   2ln2
A
1
n
r XRn
rn

  is obtained. Definition 1 assumes 
that Po(x1A) has a uniform probability, and thus Pc(X1nA) 
=  
   AA1 1,0
2
A1on Px x = 2
-nA and R(X1
nA) = –log2Pc(X1nA) = 
nA. Thus, H(SkAnr |ke←Ke) ≥ 2ln2 A
nn
r
rn
 . Because nr 
– nA = – nE – ns, and ns and nr are chosen to satisfy 
 2ln2 r
s n
n
, the relation H(SkAnr|ke←Ke)/nr ≥ 
2ln21 r
sE n
nn   ≥ 2ln21 r
s n
n  > 1 – γ is obtained. 
Because of |SkAnr| = nr, log2|SkAnr|/nr = 1 is obtained. Thus, 
H(SkAnr |ke←Ke)/nr > log2|SkAnr|/nr – γ is satisfied. Hence, 
Definition 4(3) is satisfied. 
(4) Using H(SkAnr |ke←Ke) ≥ 2ln2 A
nn
r
rn
 , nr = nA – 
nE – ns, and nA – nE ≥ u(k – tm)h(pσE), which is satisfied 
except for the small probability Pr{nue < eun – rσu2} < γ, 
we obtain 
H(SkAnr |ke←Ke)/un + γ  
≥ 2ln2 A ununn nnr
r + γ  
≥ (k – tm)/n·h(pσE) – ns/un + (γ – 2ln2 E un
nns  ). 
Using γ > 2ln2 r
s n
n
> 2ln2 uns
n
> 2ln2 E un
nns , we 
obtain (γ – 2ln2 E unnns ) > 0. Therefore, H(SkAnr 
|ke←Ke)/un + γ > (k – tm)/n·h(pσE) – ns/un. Definition 4 
(4) requires H(SkAnr |ke←Ke)/un + γ > Rs except for the 
small probability Pr{nue < eun – rσu2} < γ. If Rs = (k – 
tm)/n·h(pσE) – ns/un is selected, it satisfies Definition 4 
(4). As long as Rs is less than that, Definition 4 (4) is 
satisfied. Therefore, the selected value is the lower 
bound of Cs, where Cs is the maximum of Rs. Thus, if n, 
k, u, and ns are appropriately selected in accordance with 
the above discussion, the conditional secrecy capacity for 
the given γ is Cs ≥ (k – tm)/n·h(pσE) – ns/un.□ 
 
 Let Cs0 be the lower bound of Cs in Lemma 1, 
i.e., Cs0 = (k – tm)/n·h(pσE) – ns/un. The conditional 
secrecy capacity originates from the entropy h(pσE) of bit 
errors, as shown in Fig. 3. The common key is used only 
for transforming the entropy h(puE) of bit errors into that 
of secrecy keys. Therefore, the conditional secrecy 
capacity maintains Cs > 0 for repeated use of ke. Method 
1 restricts the secret key-generation rate to Cs0 in order to 
repeatedly use the common key ke. Lemma 1 assumes 
that Method 1 is computationally secure in the sense of 
Definition 3, and it is in Lemma 11 that security is 
proved. The reason why Lemma 1 is shown here prior to 
Lemma 11 is to determine the amount of SkAnr, i.e., nr ≤ 
unCs0. 
For simplicity, Lemma 1 assumes that all of 
SkAnr is used in message transmissions. On the other hand, 
the case in which only part of SkAnr is used in message 
transmissions is as follows. For example, when nr’ bits 
are used in message transmissions and (nr – nr’) bits are 
leaked to Eve, Cs0 is transformed into Cs0’ = (unCs0 – nr + 
nr’)/un. Although the conditional secrecy capacity varies 
depending on the amount of leaked information, the fact 
that unCs0’ indicates the capacity actually needed in 
message transmissions does not change. For this reason, 
Lemma 1 assumed that all of SkA
nr is used in message 
transmissions. 
 
ke
(k-tm)h(pσE) - ns/u
Privacy
Amp.
k
1
k
(b) Bob
(a) Eve
(d)
Error corrected
Common 
key
(c)
(f)
(e)
n-k k-tmtm k-tmtm
Delete 
…
k n-k
u
k-tmtm
…
u
k-tmtm
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k
…
u
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Delete …
h(pE)
k n-k
…
k n-k
u
u
u
h(pσE)
h(pσE’)
1
h(pB)
 
Fig. 3  Amount of information in the key-agreement protocol. Colored 
areas indicate information that Eve and Bob have. Faded colors 
indicate the range of statistical fluctuations. Blank areas indicate no 
information. u is the unit of secret key generation. (a) Eve’s received 
amount of information, evaluated in terms of the BER of pE 
information theoretically. Here, pσE =   E2EE uuu nrnp   and pσE’ 
=  
E2EE uuu
nrnp  . (b) Bob’s received amount of information. (c) 
Eve’s amount of information after considering the redundant 
information. (d) Bob can correct errors using the common key ke. (e), 
(f) Eve’s amount of information is deleted in the privacy amplification, 
where the statistical fluctuations of bit errors are considered. The 
remaining amount of information is secret. The term related to the safe 
parameter ns is not drawn because it is so small. 
5. Coding 
The conditional secrecy capacity in Lemma 1 includes a 
parameter tm that is the upper limit of the maximum 
number of errors that can be corrected per block. 
Therefore, we need to clarify tm in Method 1. For this 
purpose, an (n, k) linear code like Reed-Solomon (RS) 
code can be used [22,23]. We cannot use recent high-
performance codes that use “probabilistic” characteristics 
like Low Density Parity Check (LDPC) code instead of 
algebraic codes [22,23], because their performance is 
near the Shannon limit, and the upper limit of their 
maximum number of errors that they can correct is not 
definite. 
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5.1 Maximum Number of Errors Correctable by an 
Algebraic Code 
The upper limit of the maximum number of code word 
errors tmc that an algebraic code can correct is determined 
by the Hamming distance between code word vectors. 
Here, the algebraic code is not limited to a binary code, 
and tmc is defined for a general code. When the coding is 
binary, tmc = tm, and when it is over GF(2m), tm = mtmc. 
There is a theorem called the Singleton bound for an (n, 
k) linear code, i.e., d ≤ n – k + 1, where n is the code 
word length, k is information symbol length, and d is 
minimum distance [22,23]. When equality is satisfied in 
this theorem, the corresponding code is called a 
maximum distance separable (MDS) code. Reed-
Solomon is the most practical such code. When the 
Hamming weight wH(e) of an error e is wH(e) ≤ (d–1)/2, 
the error can be exactly corrected. This is a classical 
bound in error correction. When (d–1)/2 < wH(e) ≤ d–1, 
the candidates for the code word vectors can be listed, 
and the error has the possibility of being corrected (list 
decoding). However, when wH(e) is beyond d–1, the code 
word vector with the error usually enters the region of 
another code word vector and the error is not correctly 
detected. MDS codes have this characteristic for almost 
all errors, and the upper limit of the maximum number of 
errors that the codes can correct is given by the distance 
tmc = d–1. This distance is equal to n–k in MDS codes, 
i.e., tmc = n–k, and this is intuitively understandable 
because n–k is the number of redundant code words. The 
estimate of tmc = n–k for the upper limit of the maximum 
number of errors that the codes can correct has a 
sufficient margin, because although recent studies have 
shown the possibility of list decoding [24,25], 
correctability is restricted to the relatively nearby region 
of (d–1)/2 for practical choices of n and k.  
The above paragraph describes the case of 
hard-decision decoding. There is also soft-decision 
decoding. However, soft-decision decoding extends the 
classical bound only by one or a few code words 
depending on the code employed [26,27]. This quantity 
is sufficiently small compared with the tmc = d–1 bound 
described above for list decoding for sufficiently large d. 
As described above, MDS codes are excellent 
from the viewpoint of clarifying the upper limit of the 
maximum number of errors tmc that the codes can correct. 
For that reason, any practical system would use MDS 
codes. The example shown in sections 6.1.2 and 7.2 is a 
case of using MDS codes. 
5.2 Concrete coding method 
This section describes a concrete example of the 
encoding Ea and Eb. Encoding Ea divides x(NK) {0, 1}Nk 
into bI(N1) {0, 1}N1 and bII(N2) {0, 1}N2 by using ke  
{0, 1}NK.3 Eb encodes bI and bII independently by using 
an (n, k) linear code over GF(2m). Here, N1 and N2   
satisfy N1 + N2 = NK. The following is a concrete 
example of Ea and Eb. 
 
Coding 1 [with common key]:  
Ea: {0, 1}Nk×{ke} → {0, 1}N1×{0, 1}N2, 
x(NK)×ke ⟼ bI(N1)×bII(N2), 
where x →bI for ke = 1 and x →bII for ke = 0. 
Eb [Systematic (n, k) coding over GF(2m)]:  
{0, 1}mk → {0, 1}m(n-k), bI ⟼ cI and bII ⟼ cII  
Here, cI and cII are respectively parity check symbol 
vectors of bI and bII. N1 and k satisfy - r1σ1 ≤ N1 – 0N  ≤ 
r1σ1 and 0N  + r1σ1≤ mk for r1  >0, typically r1 = 3, 
where 0N = NK/2 and σ1
2 = NK/4. ke is repeatedly used. 
 
 The above restrictions on N1 and k are to 
prevent Eve from deriving the common key ke part-by-
part, as will be described in section 5.3. N1 and N2 
respectively denote the numbers of “1”s and “0”s in ke  
{0, 1}NK. Figure 4 schematically shows Coding 1. The 
random number sequence x  {0, 1}nl is divided into two 
groups depending on “0” and “1” in ke. The first bit of ke 
is “1” in Fig. 4, and the first bit of x is allocated to group 
I. The second bit of ke is “0,” and the second bit of x is 
allocated to group II. Subsequent bits are similarly 
allocated. Random numbers in each group are error-
correcting coded independently group-by-group. 
Because the coding is group-by-group, if the grouping is 
not correctly done in the receiver, parity check symbols 
cannot be used. Because Eve does not know the common 
key, she cannot divide the random number sequence into 
groups or correct the bit errors. This impossibility makes 
secret communications possible. 
The common key needs to be extended to 
handle a long random number sequence x. However, we 
will simply use ke repeatedly to evaluate the basic 
performance of this method. Of course, were there an 
extension that used ke as a seed key of pseudo-random 
numbers, its cryptographic power would be 
computationally strengthened.  
                                                        
3 The reason why the notations x(NK), bI(N1), and bII(N2) are 
introduced is to differentiate them from x {0, 1}nl and 
bI & bII {0, 1}mk, respectively. 
9 
 
1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 …
1    1    0 1    1 1 0    0 0    0 0    0 1 1    1 …
0 1       1       0    1 1       0    0       0 …
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Parity check 
symbol x2
Common key
Random number sequence
x  {0, 1}nl
Group I: bI
Group II: bII
Information
Symbol x1
Group I: cI
Group II: cII
0 1
1 1
0 1
1 0
ke ke ke
One block (n = 8, k = 6, m = 1)  
Fig. 4  Coding 1 schematically described. A random number sequence 
is divided into two groups in accordance with the “0s” and “1s” in the 
common key. Each group is independently error-correcting coded. In 
this figure, the key length is NK = 8, the information symbol length is k 
= 6, the parity check symbol length is n – k = 2, and m = 1. 
5.3 Common Key Length and Code Length 
Although Definition 1 (Method 1) uses a common key ke, 
the random number sequence x itself consists of true 
random numbers, and it never reflects ke. However, 
because Eve can get redundant information z2 = x2 (the 
parity check symbols cI and cII in Coding 1), she can 
possibly derive ke from it. The restrictions on N1 and k 
imposed in Coding 1 are to minimize this possibility. In 
this section, we discuss these restrictions. 
 
Lemma 2: In Coding 1 using a common key ke, if 
max(N1, N2) ≤ mk, then all information of the common 
key ke is needed even when coding one block. 
 
Proof: When each symbol of x of NK bits is allocated to 
bI or bII using ke in accordance with Coding 1, if max(N1, 
N2) ≤ mk, the numbers of bI and bII are less than or equal 
to mk. Therefore, all information of the common key is 
needed even when coding one block. □ 
 
 When a block code is used, the ke-deriving 
process using parity check symbols must be performed in 
units of one block. If max(N1, N2) > mk, there is part of 
ke that is not used for forming one block, and deriving 
part of ke becomes possible. Therefore, NK and k should 
be determined under the condition of max(N1, N2) ≤ mk. 
Let us describe N1 and N2 as functions of ke, i.e., N1(ke) 
and N2(ke). If we wholly consider {0, 1}NK as ke, 
    e2e1 ,max
e
kk
k
NN = NK. However, many cases satisfy 
N1(ke) ~ N2(ke) ~ NK/2; therefore, we will restrict the set 
of common keys to the case satisfying N1(ke) ~ N2(ke) ~ 
NK/2 as follows. 
 
[Set of common keys ke]: The set Ke of common keys ke 
of length NK is restricted to 
Ke ={ ke  {0, 1}NK | - r1σ1 ≤ N1(ke) – 0N ≤ r1σ1}. 
Here, r1 is a design parameter that is typically chosen to 
be 3.  
 
Because N1(ke) + N2(ke) = NK  , if - r1σ1 ≤ N1(ke) –
0N ≤ r1σ1, then automatically - r1σ1 ≤ N2(ke) – 0N ≤ r1σ1. 
Therefore, if ke  Ke, then     e2e1 ,max
e
kk
k
NN = 
 110 rN  , where x denotes the maximum integer ≤ x. 
Thus, if k is determined according to  110 rN  ≤ mk, 
all of ke is used to form one block in accordance with 
Lemma 2. The restrictions imposed on N1 and k in 
Coding 1 are for the above reasons. 
 Pr{ke’Ke} for ke’  {0, 1}NK is estimated as 
follows. The probability that each bit of a randomly 
chosen ke’ is 0 or 1 is p = 1/2. Thus, Nj(Ke’) (j = 1 and 2) 
obeys a binomial distribution   'eKjNP  
 
    ''
e
ee 1
'
KKK K
K
jj NNN
j
pp
N
N









. The average is 0N  = 
NK/2, and the variance is  ppN  121 K . Thus, 
Pr{ke’Ke} =  
 
 



110
110


rN
rNN
j
j
NP , where x denotes the 
minimum integer ≥ x. Let δ = Pr{ke’{0, 1}NK∖Ke}. δ is 
given by δ = 1 – Pr{ke’Ke}. For example, when r1 = 3 
and the binomial distribution is approximated with a 
normal distribution, Pr{ke’Ke} = 0.9973, and δ = 
0.0027.  
6. Deriving the common key 
The process by which Eve tries to derive the common 
key ke is equivalent to her trying to derive x1 (x1*) of one 
block as described in this section. To derive secret key 
skA in Method 1, u blocks of x1 are needed. Therefore, 
the computational complexity of deriving skA is at least 
that of deriving ke as shown in Lemma 10. Thus, we first 
evaluate the computational complexity of deriving ke. 
The information obtainable by Eve is z (z*), cI (cI*), cII 
(cII*), and skA* that is not used in message transmissions, 
where cI* and cII* are the parity check symbol vectors 
corresponding to z2*. First, we will consider that only z 
(z*), cI (cI*), and cII (cII*) are leaked and estimate the 
computational complexity of deriving ke. Section 6.1.1 
considers the case without bit errors, and section 6.1.2 
considers the case with bit errors. Next, section 6.2 takes 
skA* into consideration, and it is shown that the 
computational complexity of deriving ke does not 
decrease even if skA* is taken into consideration (Lemma 
8). Using these results, the computational complexity of 
deriving ke is quantified (Lemma 9), and Method 1 using 
Coding 1 is proved to be computationally secure in the 
sense of Definition 2 (Theorem 1). 
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6.1 Deriving the common key using parity check 
symbols 
6.1.1 Case without bit errors 
Because Eve can obtain the parity check symbols cI and 
cII in Method 1, if x (y) is transmitted without bit errors 
(z = x), she can derive ke. Let us estimate the 
computational complexity of deriving ke. The routine of 
Coding 1 is “x(NK)×kebI(N1)×bII(N2),bI×bIIcI×cII.” 
The information that Eve can obtain is z and cI×cII. 
Because z itself has no information, the derivation of ke 
is based on cI×cII. Here, bI×bII are derived from cI×cII, 
and then ke is derived by comparing bI×bII and z. 
Figure 5 shows the relation between the random 
number sequence and the first block of group I. Let G be 
the set of all elements over GF(2m). Let b0  G k be an 
information symbol vector in the first block of group I 
that is obtained from a random number sequence x using 
ke. We will describe x  b0 as b0 = f (x|ke), where b0 is a 
row vector with k components over GF(2m). Let c(p0)  
Gn–k be the parity check symbol vector corresponding to 
b0. c(p0) is given by c(p0) = b0Gp, where Gp is the parity 
check symbol generating part of the generator matrix G. 
The following lemma states a quantitative property about 
c(p0). 
 
Lemma 3: When only a parity check symbol vector is 
given in an (n, k) linear code over GF(2m), 2mk/2m(n–k) 
kinds of information symbol vectors exist for each parity 
check symbol vector. 
 
Proof: An (n, k) linear code over GF(2m) consists of mk 
bits of information symbols and m(n – k) bits of parity 
check symbols. When the information symbols are 
derived from only parity check symbols, mk – m(n – k) 
bits cannot be determined. Therefore, 2mk–m(n–k) kinds of 
information symbols exist for each parity check symbol 
vector. □ 
 
Let us define the set B0 for the 2mk/2m(n–k) kinds of 
information symbol vectors that are associated with c(p0): 
B0 ={ b0’ | c(p0) = b0’Gp }. 
Of course, b0 B0. 
Next, we define the set Ke0 by using B0 and Ke: 
Ke0 ={ke’Ke| b0’= f (x|ke’) B0}. 
The elements of Ke0 are the candidates of the common 
key. The number of candidates can be determined as 
follows: 
 
Lemma 4: Suppose a common key ke  Ke is used 
according to Coding 1. A random number sequence and a 
parity check symbol vector for the first block of group I 
or II are exactly given, and one of the positions of the 
random number sequence corresponding to the first bit of 
the common key is given to form the first block. The 
number of the candidates for the common key in this 
case is Ncand = 2NK–m(n–k)(1–δ) on average. Here, (1–δ) is a 
factor due to ke  {0, 1}NK∖Ke. 
 
Proof: Let the random number sequence be x, and let the 
parity check symbol vector be c(p0), where the parity 
check symbol vector is represented by that of the first 
block of group I. The candidates of the common key are 
obtained by listing the elements of B0, comparing the 
elements with x, and listing the elements of Ke0. The 
parity check symbol vectors are of 2m(n–k) kinds, and the 
number of elements of Ke is 2NK(1–δ). In this case, when 
a parity check symbol vector c(p0) is given, the number of 
candidates of the common key is Ncand = 2NK–m(n–k)(1–δ) 
on average. □ 
 
The information obtainable by Eve about the 
first block of group I is z = x and c(p0). According to 
Lemma 4, Eve can narrow down the candidates of ke to 
Ncand on average. This number can be made tremendously 
large if we appropriately choose NK, m, n, k, and δ. 
However, a listing is possible in principle even though no 
memory with a high enough capacity exists. Eve can 
check each of the listed elements by decoding the blocks 
of group II and other blocks of group I, and she can 
continue this process until the candidates of ke have been 
narrowed down to one. 
 
Corollary 1: Let us assume that only a random number 
sequence and parity check symbols are given in Method 
1 using Coding 1. It is impossible to derive only part of 
the common key. 
 
Proof: This claim is apparently true from the fact that 
deriving the common key is processed in units of one 
block and that one block is constructed using all the 
information about the common key, due to the condition 
0N  + r1σ1≤ mk. □ 
 
Corollary 2: Let us assume that only a random number 
sequence and parity check symbols are given in Method 
1 using Coding 1. The computational complexity of 
deriving at least one bit of the common key is O(Ncand) 
under the condition that no bit errors exist. In other 
words, an exhaustive search of Ncand is needed. 
 
Proof: Because deriving only part of the common key is 
impossible according to Corollary 1, the whole common 
key needs to be derived even for only one bit. In this 
case, the computational complexity is O(Ncand) because 
the process in narrowing down the candidates of the 
common key based on Lemma 4 involves the complexity 
of O(Ncand).□ 
11 
x b0
b0’
xe
b1
b1’
bi
bi’
Random 
numbers
Information 
symbols
(2m)k
Parity check 
symbols
(2m)n – k
B0
B1
B i
c(p0)
ke
kei
ke1
e1
ei
c(p1)
c(pi)
bj
bj’
B j c(pj)
f
ke’
Ke0
Ke1
Kei
ej
 
Fig. 5  Relation between random number sequence and information 
symbols + parity check symbols in the first block of group I. Here, z = 
xe. 
6.1.2 Case with bit errors 
When bit errors exist, Eve needs to consider all possible 
error patterns to derive the common key. She modifies 
information symbols according to each bit-error pattern 
and uses the strategy described in the above subsection. 
The number of errors obeys a binominal 
distribution, and the occurrence probability is highest for 
the average number of errors. Therefore, let us first 
concretely estimate the number of error patterns for the 
average number of errors. 
 There is no bit error in parity check symbols in 
Method 1. The number of information symbols in an (n, 
k) code over GF(2m) is mk bits, and the average number 
of bit errors is en = pEmk in one block. The number of 
bit-error patterns is 





en
mk
, and it can be approximated 
using Stirling’s formula, n! ≃ nnenn 2 , as 






en
mk
≃
 
ee
eeee2
nnmk
n
mk
nmk
mk
nnmk
mk



















. 
 The parameters n and k are determined so as to 
correct errors with a sufficient margin; e.g., the 3σ2 
region is included inside the error-correctable region 
with a sufficient margin, where σ2 is the standard 
deviation of the bit-error distribution. An MDS code is 
error-correctable for code word errors satisfying wH(e) ≤ 
(n–k)/2, as described in section 5.1; therefore, the bit 
errors up to (n–k)/2 are exactly correctable, and en +3σ2 
< (n–k)/2 is the condition for determining k. For example, 
Let us consider the case of m = 8, n = 2m – 1 = 255, k = 
167, and peff = 0.1, where peff is the code-error rate given 
by peff = 1 – (1 – pE)m. In this case, en ≃ 17.5、σ2 ≃ 
4.15、 en +3σ2 = 29.95 < (n–k)/2 = 44, and 





en
mk
≃ 2.8 
× 1039 (1.0 × 2131). 
 
Lemma 5: Let us assume that only a random number 
sequence and parity check symbols are given in Method 
1 using Coding 1. Let Nep be the number of error patterns 
in one block. When bit errors exist, the computational 
complexity of deriving at least one bit of the common 
key is O(Nep·Ncand). 
 
Proof: Let us choose the first block of group I as a 
representative (see Fig. 5). Let ei be an error vector in the 
first block of group I, where the Hamming weights 
satisfy wH(ei) ≤ (d – 1)/2, i = 1, 2, 3, … We define bi’ = 
b0’ + ei for b0’ B 0. Given bi = b0 + ei and c(pi) = biGp, 
then bi’Gp = (b0’ + ei)Gp = (b0’ + bi – b0)Gp = biGp = c(pi), 
and B0 Bi =  for Bi ={bi’ | c(pi) = bi’Gp}. Let xe be a 
random number sequence with bit errors. Moreover, if 
we define Kei ={keiKe | bi’= f (xe|kei) Bi}, the elements 
of Kei are the candidates of the common key in error 
pattern ei. Similarly, if we define bj = b0 + ej, c(pj) = bjGp, 
Bj ={bj’ | c(pj) = bj’Gp}, and Kej ={kejKe | bj’= f (xe|kej) 
Bj} for another error vector ej (wH(ej) ≤ (d – 1)/2, j ≠ i), 
then B0 Bj =  and Bi Bj = . Because bi’= f (xe|kei) is 
a single-valued function, Kei Kej = . Thus, there is no 
overlap between the candidates of the common key for 
different error vectors. Because the occurrence of each 
error pattern is probabilistic, Eve must consider all such 
patterns when deriving the common key and there are 
candidates of the common key described in Lemma 4 for 
every pattern. Thus, the computational complexity of 
deriving at least one bit of the common key is 
O(Nep·Ncand) according to Corollary 2. □. 
 
 For the parameters described in this section, 
when only the error patterns for the average number 
en ≃ 17.5 of errors are considered, the computational 
complexity of deriving the common key is O(2131·Ncand) 
according to Lemma 5. 
 This estimation considers only the error 
patterns for the average number of errors, while the 
actual number of bit errors is distributed with a standard 
deviation of σ2 around en . We need to consider all 
possible error patterns, and their probabilities of 
occurring as well. The number of patterns when each 
probability is different can be estimated using the 
Shannon entropy. For example, an entropy of 131 bits 
effectively corresponds to 2131 error patterns. 
 The parameters used in coding are controlled 
such that Bob can correct any errors. The number of bit 
errors is in the error-correctable region, i.e., Pr{ne > (d – 
12 
1)/2} << 1. In this case, Lemma 6 is satisfied. 
 
Lemma 6: Let us assume that only a random number 
sequence and parity check symbols are given in Method 
1 using Coding 1. Let ne be the number of bit errors in 
one block. If Pr{ne > (d – 1)/2} << 1 is satisfied, the 
computational complexity of deriving at least one bit of 
the common key is O( cand
p2 N
H
), where Hp ≃ mk·h(pE). 
 
Proof: The number of error patterns in one block is 






en
mk
 for ne bit errors, and the occurrence probability 
of each error pattern is pn =   ee EE 1
nmkn
pp

 . The 
Shannon entropy of the error-correctable region, i.e., 0 ≤ 
ne ≤ (d – 1)/2, is Hp = 
  










21
0
2
ee
log
d
n
nn pp
n
mk
. If Pr{ne 
> (d – 1)/2} << 1 is satisfied, 
  


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






21
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ee
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nn pp
n
mk
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nn pp
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mk
121
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ee
log ; therefore, we obtain 
Hp ≃ 








mk
n
nn pp
n
mk
0
2
ee
log  by extending the region of 
the sum to mk. This quantity considers all error patterns 
for an mk bit sequence. In this case, it is equal to the 
equivocation for mk bits, and Hp ≃ mk·h(pE). Thus, the 
computational complexity of deriving at least one bit of 
the common key is O( cand
p2 N
H
), and Hp ≃ mk·h(pE). □ 
 
 This computational complexity can be 
checked by making the following rough estimate. 
Suppose m = 8, k = 167, and peff = 0.1 (pE ≃ 0.0131); 
then Hp ≃ 134. From σ2 ≃ 4.15 and 





en
mk
≃ 1.0 × 2131, 
we find that 





en
mk
22 ≃
p2
H
, and p2
H
 is surely the 
effective number of error patterns. 
 The truth or falseness of each candidate can be 
judged by decoding a sufficient number of blocks with 
the candidate common key as follows: When a candidate 
is true, the number of bit errors is distributed around en  
in all blocks, and parity check symbols are never an error. 
In contrast, parity check symbols can be an error when a 
candidate is false. Moreover, in this case, because the 
information symbols become a haphazard sequence, the 
code word vector for it is probabilistically uniformly 
spread out over the code word vector space, and the 
number of bit errors is uniformly distributed throughout 
the correctable error numbers. Thus, each candidate can 
be judged as being true or false from the distribution of 
errors if a sufficient number of blocks are checked. 
 
Lemma 7: Let us assume that only random number 
sequence and parity check symbols are given in Method 
1 using Coding 1. The computational complexity of 
deriving the information symbols of one block, i.e., x1 
(x1*), is equal to that of deriving at least one bit of the 
common key. 
 
Proof: As shown in the proof of Lemma 4 and the 
following paragraph, the process of deriving the common 
key ke consists of listing the candidates of information 
symbols and ke, checking each candidate ke using other 
blocks, and obtaining the final solution. The process of 
deriving the information symbols of a target block also 
consists of listing the candidates of information symbols 
and checking them. To check them, the candidates of ke 
are listed and each candidate ke is checked using other 
blocks. It is when the final solution of ke is confirmed 
that the candidate of the information symbols is 
confirmed. According to Corollary 1, it is impossible to 
derive only part of the common key. Thus, Lemma 7 is 
satisfied. □ 
6.2 Deriving the common key by using skA* 
According to the assumption, Eve obtains not only z (z*), 
cI (cI*), and cII (cII*) but also skA* that is not used 
message transmissions. Can skA* ease deriving the 
common key ke? The following Lemma 8 sweeps away 
this concern. 
 The conditional secrecy capacity is Cs ≥ Cs0 = 
(k – tm)/n·h(pσE) – ns/un for binary coding from Lemma 1. 
When the coding is over GF(2m), n and k are translated 
into mn and mk, and tm = mtmc. Therefore, Cs ≥ Cs0 = (k – 
tmc)/n·h(pσE) – ns/umn when the coding is over GF(2m). 
The condition for nr in Method 1 is translated into nr/unm 
≤ Cs0. Thus, nr/u ≤ nmCs0 = m(k – tmc)·h(pσE) – ns/u. Let 
Hs’ = nr/u and Hs = nmCs0; then, Hs’ ≤ Hs. Hs’ is the 
number of secret keys generated per block. In Method 1, 
u ≥ 1. 
 Secret keys are generated from noise. There is 
a rare case where the number of bit errors is extremely 
small owing to the statistical fluctuations of noise. We 
assume that the rare case is bounded with a small 
quantity γ, i.e., Pr{nue < eun – rσu2} < γ. In addition, we 
assume that Eve’s residual information after the secret 
key generation is also bounded by the small quantity γ, 
i.e., I(SkAnr|ke←Ke; SkEnr)/nr < γ. 
 
Lemma 8: In Method 1 using Coding 1, the 
computational complexity of Eve’s deriving at least one 
bit of the common key is equal to that of deriving it only 
from a random number sequence and parity check 
symbols if the effects of Pr{nue < eun – rσu2} < γ and 
I(SkAnr|ke←Ke; SkEnr)/nr < γ are negligible, where γ is a 
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small quantity. 
 
Proof: According to the assumption, Eve can obtain skA* 
that is not used for message transmissions. Let us assume 
that skA* is generated from the block Eve wants to 
analyze. If the inverse operation of universal hashing 
used in generating secret keys were easy for Eve, the 
information symbols x1* in that block could be derived, 
and the number Ns of candidates would satisfy Ns ≥ 2mk–
Hs’, where equality corresponds to the case of u = 1. 
When the information symbols are derived by using one 
block of parity check symbols, the number of candidates 
is Np = 2mk–m(n–k) according to Lemma 3. When the error-
correcting code works correctly, the amount of redundant 
information m(n – k) exceeds the entropy of the bit errors 
mk·h(pE), i.e., m(n – k) ≥ mk·h(pE). Because of Hs = m(k 
– tmc)·h(pσE) – ns/u, mk·h(pE) > Hs is satisfied. Because 
Hs ≥ Hs’, m(n – k) > Hs’. Thus, Np < Ns. Next, let us 
assume that Eve tries to correlate the information in the 
random-number transmission stage with skA*. However, 
because skA* is generated in the capacity of nr/u ≤ nmCs0, 
as long as Eve fails to derive x1*, the information in the 
random-number transmission stage is uncorrelated with 
skA* if the effects of Pr{nue < eun – rσu2} < γ and 
I(SkAnr|ke←Ke; SkEnr)/nr < γ are negligible. (See Fig. 3 and 
proof (2) of Lemma 1.) Without any correlation, it is 
advantageous for Eve to use the information in the 
random-number transmission stage when trying to derive 
the common key, but not to use skA* because of Np < Ns. 
Therefore, Eve will use the information in the random-
number transmission stage until she succeeds in deriving 
x1*. Thus, Lemma 8 is satisfied. □ 
 
 Pr{nue < eun – rσu2} can be made 
exponentially small, as follows. The number of bit errors 
obeys a binomial distribution. When it is approximated 
with a normal distribution, Pr{nue < eun – rσu2} 
≃  



r
t dte 2
2
21  =  reO r 22 , where t = (nue – 
eun )/σu2. Thus, Pr{nue < eun – rσu2} is exponentially small 
if r is appropriately chosen. I(SkAnr|ke←Ke; SkEnr)/nr can 
be also exponentially small. As described in the proof of 
Lemma 1, I(SkAnr|ke←Ke; SkEnr)/nr ≤ 2ln2 r
s n
n
. 
Because ns and nr can be chosen to be O(umn), when 
umn is sufficiently large, 2ln2 r
s n
n
 is exponentially 
small. Thanks to these characteristics, we can choose a 
sufficiently small γ. 
 
Corollary 3: In Method 1 using Coding 1, the 
computational complexity of Eve’s deriving x1* is equal 
to that of deriving it only from a random number 
sequence and parity check symbols if the effects of 
Pr{nue < eun – rσu2} < γ and I(SkA
nr|ke←Ke; SkEnr)/nr < γ 
are negligible, where γ is a small quantity. 
 
Proof: The corollary is apparent from the proof of 
Lemma 8. □ 
 
Lemma 9 follows from Lemmas 6 and 8. 
 
Lemma 9: In Method 1 using Coding 1, the 
computational complexity of Eve’s deriving at least one 
bit of the common key ke is O( cand
p2 N
H
) if the effects of 
Pr{nue < eun – rσu2} < γ and I(SkA
nr|ke←Ke; SkEnr)/nr < γ 
are negligible, where γ is a small quantity. 
 
Corollary 4: The effective key length in Method 1 using 
Coding 1 is NK – m(n – k) + mk·h(pE) + log2(1 – δ). 
 
Proof: The corollary is apparent from  cand2 p2log NH = 
NK – m(n – k) + mk·h(pE) + log2(1 – δ). □ 
 
Corollary 5: In Method 1 using Coding 1, the 
computational complexity of Eve’s deriving x1 (x1*) is 
O( cand
p2 N
H
) if the effects of Pr{nue < eun – rσu2} < γ 
and I(SkAnr|ke←Ke; SkEnr)/nr < γ are negligible, where γ is 
a small quantity. 
 
Proof: The corollary is apparent from Corollary 3 and 
Lemmas 7 and 9. □ 
 
Lemma 10: In Method 1 using Coding 1, the 
computational complexity of Eve’s deriving at least one 
bit of the secret key skA is at least O( cand
p2 N
H
) if the 
effects of Pr{nue < eun – rσu2} < γ and I(SkA
nr|ke←Ke; 
SkEnr)/nr < γ are negligible, where γ is a small quantity. 
 
Proof: Because secret keys are generated from x1 in units 
of u blocks, when Eve derives at least one bit of the 
secret key skA, she needs x1 for u blocks; moreover, she 
needs to perform algorithm S for generating the secret 
keys. From Corollary 5, the computational complexity of 
only deriving one block of x1 is O( cand
p2 N
H
) if the 
effects of Pr{nue < eun – rσu2} < γ and I(SkA
nr|ke←Ke; 
SkEnr)/nr < γ are negligible. To derive at least one bit of 
skA, algorithm S must be analyzed moreover. Thus, 
Lemma 10 is satisfied. □ 
 
Lemma 11: In Method 1 using Coding 1, encoding Ea is 
computationally secure in the sense of Definition 3. 
 
Proof: Let η = 1/γ. From Corollary 5, the computational 
complexity of Eve’s deriving x1 (x1*) is {O( cand
p2 N
H
)[1 
–O(1/η)] + O(1/η)} by taking into account Pr{nue < eun – 
rσu2} < γ and I(SkAnr|ke←Ke; SkEnr)/nr < γ, where γ is a 
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small quantity; the term O(1/η) comes from those rare 
cases, and the term O( cand
p2 N
H
)[1 – O(1/η)] comes from 
the other cases. Thus, the probability of successfully 
guessing information symbols, pd in Definition 3, is pd ≤ 
1/2k +         11121 candp OONO H  . The parameter 
mk is determined such that it satisfies  110 rN  ≤ mk, 
and thus, mk = O(NK). Moreover, mn = O(mk). Thus, NK–
m(n–k) = O(NK). As is apparent from Ncand = 2NK–m(n–
k)(1–δ), the parameters NK, m, n and k are chosen such 
that NK –m(n–k) > 0. In summary, NK–m(n–k) = O(NK) > 
0. Hence, Ncand = 2NK–m(n–k)(1–δ) > P(NK) is satisfied at NK 
→ ∞ for every polynomial equation P(NK). In addition, γ 
→ 0 can be chosen for NK → ∞. Therefore, when k0 is 
chosen sufficiently large, pd < 1/2k + 1/P(NK) is satisfied 
for NK ≥ k0. Thus, encoding Ea in Method 1 using Coding 
1 is computationally secure in the sense of Definition 3. 
□ 
 
 The following theorem is obtained from 
Lemma 10. 
 
Theorem 1: Method 1 using Coding 1 is computationally 
secure in the sense of Definition 2. 
 
Proof: Let η = 1/γ. From Lemma 10, the computational 
complexity of Eve’s deriving any one bit of the secret 
key skA is at least {O( cand
p2 N
H
)[1 –O(1/η)] + O(1/η)} by 
taking into account Pr{nue < eun – rσu2} < γ and 
I(SkAnr|ke←Ke; SkEnr)/nr < γ, where γ is a small quantity. 
Therefore, the probability of successfully guessing the 
secret key, ps in Definition 2, is ps ≤ 1/2 
+         11121 candp OONO H  . The parameter mk 
is determined such that it satisfies  110 rN  ≤ mk, and 
thus, mk = O(NK). Moreover, mn = O(mk). Thus, NK–
m(n–k) = O(NK). As is apparent from Ncand = 2NK–m(n–
k)(1–δ), the parameters NK, m, n and k are chosen such 
that NK –m(n–k) > 0. In summary, NK–m(n–k) = O(NK) > 
0. Hence, Ncand = 2NK–m(n–k)(1–δ) > P(NK) is satisfied at NK 
→ ∞ for every polynomial equation P(NK). In addition, γ 
→ 0 can be chosen for NK → ∞. Therefore, when k0 is 
chosen sufficiently large, ps < 1/2 + 1/P(NK) is satisfied 
for NK ≥ k0. Thus, Method 1 using Coding 1 is 
computationally secure in the sense of Definition 2. □ 
 
 The redundant information x2 is transmitted 
through a public channel in Method 1. This is to make 
the security analysis easy. However, an actual system 
might transmit x2 through the same channel as that for x. 
For this reason, the following Method 2 is defined. 
 
Method 2: In this modification of Method 1, x2 is 
transmitted through the same channel as x (See Fig. 6).  
 
 In this case, bit errors occur in x2, and deriving 
the common key is more difficult than that in Method 1. 
Therefore, the claim of Theorem 1 is true for Method 2. 
 
Corollary 6: Method 2 using Coding 1 is 
computationally secure in the sense of Definition 2. 
 
 Lemma 11, Theorem 1, and Corollary 6 can be 
proved without assuming any mathematical difficulties. 
This means that Methods 1 and 2 using Coding 1 face no 
threat that an efficient decrypting algorithm might be found. 
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Fig. 6  Block diagram of Method 2. 
7. Design example 
7.1 Parameters 
Table 1 summarizes Method 1 using Coding 1. As 
mentioned in section 5.3, the parameters should be 
determined such that  110 rN  ≤ mk in order to 
prevent Eve from deriving the common key part-by-part. 
For example, given a (255, 167) linear code over GF(28) 
and NK = 2496, then 0N =1248, mk = 1336, and σ1 ≃ 
24.98; in this case,  110 rN  = 1335 < mk is satisfied 
for r1 = 3.5. In other words, we can choose NK = 2496 in 
this code. The computational complexity of deriving the 
common key is proportional to cand
p2 N
H
 ≃ 
     122 knmNphmk E K  ≃ 21926(1–δ) for pE ≃ 0.0131 
due to Lemma 6. This value seems to be sufficiently 
large; if a larger value is required, we can enlarge the 
block size. 
 So far, we have used the common key 
repeatedly. This is because we wanted to evaluate the 
basic performance of the proposed method. However, if 
we use the common key more cryptographically, i.e., as a 
seed key of pseudo-random numbers, the security will 
increase computationally. Moreover, bit errors will still 
enhance security. In the analysis described in section 
6.1.2, the security was determined by only the 
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complexity of the analysis for one block. This is because 
the common key is repeatedly used. However, if pseudo-
random numbers are used instead, the number of blocks 
needed to derive the common key increases. Let the 
needed number of blocks be NT. In this case, the entropy 
of noise that affects the analysis is NT·mk·h(pE), and the 
effective key length increases. This effect is powerful 
because it is information theoretic. For the above 
example, where m(n – k) = 704 and Hp ≃ 134, 
cand
p2 N
HNT > 2NK(1–δ) is satisfied for NT ≥ 6. In this case, 
an exhaustive search of Ke is needed for deriving the 
common key. Moreover, the following observations can 
be made. We assumed that parity check symbols exactly 
leak to Eve in Method 1. However, when we use Method 
2, it adds bit errors to the parity check symbols, and 
consequently, its security increases. Moreover, x and x2 
are transmitted without encryption in Methods 1 and 2. If 
x and x2 are encrypted with pseudo-random numbers, 
security increases computationally, although another key 
is needed. 
Table 1  Summary of Method 1 using Coding 1 
 Example 
(0) Share common key 
Ke ={ke{0, 1}NK | - r1σ1 ≤ N1(ke) – 0N ≤ r1σ1} 
N1 + N2 = NK 
NK = 2496 
0
N =1248 
r1 = 3.5 
σ1 ≃ 24.98 
(1) Generate random number sequence 
   x ← RX 
 
(2a) Divide random number sequence 
x(NK)×ke ⟼ bI(N1)×bII(N2) 
Fig. 1 
(2b) Perform (n, k) block coding:  
bI ⟼ cI and bII ⟼ cII 
0
N + r1σ1≤ mk 
RS code over GF(2m) 
n = 255 
k = 167 
m = 8 
(3) Generate secret key (Privacy amplification) Table II 
7.2 Conditional secrecy capacity 
Let us estimate an example of the conditional secrecy 
capacity when using Method 1, a (255, 167) linear MDS 
code over GF(28), and Peff = 0.1 (pE ≃ 0.0131). 
 As described in section 6.2, when the coding 
is over GF(2m), Cs ≥ (k – tmc)/n·h(pσE) – ns/umn. If u = 1 
and r = 3, then eun = umkpE ≃ 17.5, σu2 
=  EE 1 pumkp  ≃ 4.15, pσE =   e2eE uuu nrnp  ≃ 
0.00376, and h(pσE) ≃ 0.0357. Thus, Cs ≥ (k – 
tmc)/n·h(pσE) – ns/umn ≃ 0.0111 – ns/umn. If we choose ns 
= 10, then Cs ≥ 0.00615 and nr ≥ 12.5. Here, “≥” is used 
to indicate a lower bound. 
 Let us determine γ by referring to the above 
values, although this process is the inverse of that from 
the viewpoint of the meaning that γ should be given first. 
The condition in Definition 4 (1) is Pr{SkAnr ≠ SkAnr |ke ← 
Ke} < γ. Let ncb be the number of Bob’s code errors in 
one block. When u =1, then Pr{SkAnr ≠ SkBnr |ke ← Ke} = 
Pr{ncb > (n – k)/2}. The method in this report works 
efficiently when pB – pE << pE (see section 7.5). 
Therefore, let us assume pB = pE as an example. In this 
case, Pr{ncb > (n – k)/2} < 4.70×10-10, where the third 
decimal place is rounded up. Definition 4 (2) requires 
I(SkAnr|ke←Ke; SkEnr)/nr < γ, except for the rare case of 
nue/umk < pσE. The probability of the rare case is 
Pr{nue/umk < pσE} < 4.48×10-4 for Peff = 0.1, and 
I(SkAnr|ke←Ke; SkEnr)/nr ≤ 2ln2 r
s n
n  < 1.13×10-4. From 
the above three kinds of small values, γ ≤ max(4.70×10-10, 
4.48×10-4, 1.13×10-4) = 4.48×10-4. Table I summarizes 
these values. 
 Cs increases as u increases, and γ can be 
decreased as r and ns are increased. If u = 10 and r = 5, 
then 
eun = umkpE ≃ 175, σu2 =  EE 1 pumkp  ≃ 13.1, 
pσE =   e2eE uuu nrnp  ≃ 0.00817, and h(pσE) ≃ 
0.0684. Thus, Cs ≥ 0.0212 – ns/umn. Here, if ns = 16, 
then Cs ≥ 0.0204, nr ≥ 416. Table I lists γ–related values. 
It also shows the case of u = 10, r = 3, and ns = 10. When 
u →∞, then h(pE) ≃ 0.101 and Cs ≥ 0.0312. 
Table 2  Lower bound of conditional secrecy capacity and related 
quantities at (n, k) = (255, 167), m = 8, and Peff = 0.1 (pE ≃ 0.0131). (1) 
is related to Definition 4 (1); (2.1) is related to Definition 4 (2) and (4); 
(2.2) is related to Definition 4 (2). The third decimal place is rounded 
up in those rows. ncb denotes the number of Bob’s code errors in one 
block. nue denotes the number of Eve’s bit errors in u blocks. 
u 1 10 10 
r 3 3 5 
ns 10 10 16 
(1) Pr{ncb > (n – k)/2} < 4.70×10-10 4.70×10-9 4.70×10-9 
(2.1) Pr{nue/mk < pσE} < 4.48×10-4 9.63×10-4 5.07×10-8 
(2.2) 2-ns/nrln2 < 1.13×10-4 2.79×10-6 5.29×10-8 
γ ≤ 4.48×10-4 9.63×10-4 5.29×10-8 
Cs ≥ 0.00615 0.0248 0.0204 
nr/u ≥ 12.5 50.6 41.6 
7.3 Multiple codes 
Two kinds of error-correcting codes are often combined 
to make the error correction perfect, e.g., product codes 
and concatenated codes [23]. The method in this report 
can be modified to suit double coding using two kinds of 
common keys. A concrete example is as follows. 
 The random numbers, amounting to Nb blocks 
of groups I and II, of a sequence coded using ke are 
shuffled, and the shuffled sequence is then coded using 
another common key ked. The parameters for the two 
codes do not need to be the same. Decoding is possible 
from either the ke- or ked-related code, and this double 
coding is resistant to burst errors. For example, let us 
decode the ke-related code first and assume there are 
residual errors. Because the random number sequence is 
shuffled, the residual errors are distributed over multiple 
blocks in the ked-related code. They can be corrected 
through ked-related error correction. Here, although the 
shuffling process becomes computationally expensive, 
Nb should be as large as possible. The value of Nb should 
be determined on the basis of the processing 
performance of the transmitter and receiver. 
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 The double coding is for complete error 
correction, but there is a possibility that all errors will be 
corrected in one decoding. The security of this method, 
therefore, is quantified by the complexity of the 
decryption process of one of the two codes. An important 
thing in double coding is to prevent the parity check 
symbols in one of the two codes from affecting the 
complexity of the decryption process in the other code. 
 As mentioned in section 6.1.1, the process of 
deriving the common key includes listing the candidates 
of the information symbols for one block as a basic 
component. Because this listing is a closed process for 
one block, the parity check symbols in the ke( ked)-related 
code do not contribute to the process of listing the 
candidates of the information symbols in the ked(ke)-
related code. Therefore, the security of this method is 
determined by the complexity of deriving only one of the 
common keys. However, the conditional secrecy capacity 
changes. Here, let the block size be the same for both 
codings. Because redundant information on the ke( ked)-
related code can correct tm (tmd) bits at maximum, the 
conditional secrecy capacity is Cs ≥ (k – tm – tmd)/n·h(pσE) 
– ns/un. Here, tm and tmd can be set less than those of 
single coding thanks to double coding. 
7.4 Noise source 
The output of an LD used in optical communications 
includes noise; the phase of the output light is especially 
noisy and is sufficiently random [15]. Coding methods 
like Phase-Shift Keying (PSK) or Differential Phase-
Shift Keying (DPSK) use the phase of light. Thus, the 
method in this report can use phase noise-related bit 
errors as a resource that is always available in optical 
communications. 
7.5 BER in random-number transmission channel 
As mentioned in the preceding subsection, the phase 
noise of an LD output is directly usable in optical 
communications. However, when the environmental 
noise Ft in a transmission channel is large, the condition 
pE ≃ pB (pB – pE << pE) is not satisfied, where much 
redundant information is required and the conditional 
secrecy capacity decreases. One solution in this case is to 
code the transmitter output Fc(X) with an error-correcting 
code and to build a pseudo-errorless channel (pE = pB). 
Because the purpose of this coding is to transmit a 
random number sequence with errors correctly, the 
decoded sequence has errors, and Eve does not obtain 
any new information. 
8. Summary 
Secure communications using noise generally need a 
mechanism to make Eve less advantageous than Bob. 
However, such a mechanism does not always exist 
intrinsically. This report described an extrinsic method 
that makes Eve disadvantageous by using a common key. 
The common key, error-correcting code, and noise are 
managed in a cooperative manner, and the secret keys are 
generated from noise. Messages are encrypted with the 
secret keys by using a one-time pad. As a result, 
information leaks that are meaningful to Eve are 
restricted to the parity-check symbols for the random 
numbers. It is possible to derive the candidates of the 
common key from the parity check symbols, and the 
security of this method can be quantified in terms of the 
computations needed for an exhaustive search of the 
candidates. We calculated the number of the candidates 
of the common key by assuming all parity check 
symbols were leaked to Eve without bit errors. The 
number is cand
p2 N
H
, and it determines the security of 
this method. Its logarithm NK – m(n – k) + mk·h(pE) + 
log2(1 – δ) corresponds to the effective key length. 
Methods with computational security generally face the 
threat that an efficient decryption method might be found. 
However, this method does not rely on any mathematical 
difficulties, and therefore, there is no threat that a more 
efficient decryption method than an exhaustive search 
might be found. The method requires listing the 
information symbols from the parity check symbols 
followed by listing the candidates of the common key in 
decryption. This threat-less form of security can be used 
to protect highly confidential information like 
government and military secrets, although its security 
level is computational. However, it requires privacy 
amplification to assure high security, and this reduces the 
message transmission rate to Rm << 1. 
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